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NOTES
CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN SUPPORT TRUSTS
In the simple trust situation, the beneficiary's interest is subject to
being reached by his creditors' in satisfaction of their claims. 2 With
three kinds of trusts, namely, spendthrift, support, and discretionary
trusts, however, the beneficiary's interest is more or less immune to
the demands of his creditors, due either to the settlor's having placed
a restraint on alienation by the beneficiary, or because the beneficiary's
interest is of such a personal or uncertain nature that the courts hesi-
tate to allow creditors to subject it to their claims.3 The purpose of
this note is to examine one of these relatively immune trusts, the sup-
port trust, and to ascertain which creditors, if any, can reach the bene-
ficiary's interest, and why other creditors are denied.
In order to analyze with any degree of precision the cases dealing
with attempts by creditors to reach the interests of support trust bene-
ficiaries, it is essential first to distinguish carefully between support
trusts and other related trusts of a spendthrift or discretionary na-
ture.4
The terms of a spendthrift trust provide that the beneficiary can-
not assign or otherwise transfer his right to receive trust income or
corpus, and that his creditors cannot reach his interest in the trust.5
1. In this note, "creditor" is used in a wider sense than its strict legal meaning.
In addition to persons to whom a debt is owed, "creditor" here includes persons
to whom other obligations are owed, such as the duty of support and maintenance
owed one's minor children.
2. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 147 (1935).
3. As a general rule-of-thumb, it is said that the measure of what a benefici-
ary's creditor can recover from the trust is the amount which the beneficiary
can assign. Since the very nature of spendthrift, support, and discretionary
trusts forbids any assignment by the beneficiary of his right, creditors cannot
reach such trusts, at least insofar as the rule-of-thumb is valid.
4. Courts have often been guilty of the grossest sort of obfuscation by lumping
support and discretionary trusts under the title "spendthrift," which has un-
doubtedly contributed to a good deal of the inconsistency and confusion encoun-
tered in this area. See Jones v. Coon, 229 Iowa 756, 762, 295 N.W. 162, 165
(1940).
5. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§
149-53 (1935). Often, spendthrift clauses are found in support and discretionary
trusts, where the settler wishes to ensure in a double-barrelled manner that his
intention be fulfilled. See, e.g., Guernsey v. Lazear, 51 W. Va. 328, 41 S.E. 405(1902), a case involving a trust with both support and spendthrift clauses. Since
the court held that the spendthrift clause kept creditors from reaching the
beneficiary's interest, it was unnecessary to consider what the effect of the sup-
port clause was, or would have been, had there been no spendthrift clause.
In general, where there is a spendthrift clause and a support clause in a trust
instrument, and creditors are allowed to recover, it is clear that the court must
have held that both clauses were invalid as against the creditors. On the other
hand, where the creditor is denied recovery, unless the court's language is ex-
plicit, it cannot be told whether the spendthrift or the support clause or both
presented such a bar. Likewise, where there is a support trust without an ex-
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
In short, the trust instrument creates a restraint on alienation which
operates to keep trust property and income inaccessible to assignees
and creditors so long as it remains in the hands of the trustee. Once
property is turned over to the beneficiary, however, it can be freely
reached by creditors or transferees.,
A discretionary trust provides that the trustee in his complete and
uncontrolled discretion may turn over property to the beneficiary or
may exclude him entirely from all benefit.7 Since the beneficiary has
no enforceable interest in the trust until the trustee chooses to exer-
cise this discretion in his favor, the assignees and creditors of the
beneficiary are unable to reach the trust property.8
A support trust is created when the terms of the trust instrument
provide that the trustee shall pay to or apply for the beneficiary so
much of the trust income or of the trust income and principal as is
necessary for the support, maintenance, or education of the bene-
ficiary:
The courts have often given the title "support trust" to a wholly
different kind of trust: one in which the trustee is directed to pay the
entire trust income or a specified sum to the beneficiary for the bene-
ficiary's "support and maintenance."',, Here the direction to pay such
sum for "support and maintenance" is a mere precatory phrase indi-
cating for what the settlor would wqish the beneficiary to use his in-
come, rather than an explicit command, and clearly distinguishes this
type of trust from a true support trust, where the beneficiary's inter-
est is measured by his need.,, Unless such a pseudo-support trust con-
press spendthrift clause, and the court in refusing the creditor recovery talks in
terms of spendthrift trusts, often it cannot be ascertained whether the court is
confusing support and spendthrift trusts, or whether it is reading a spendthrift
clause into the trust by inferring that in the use of support trust language the
settlor actually intended to create a spendthrift trust.
6. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 370 (2d ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
. 152, comment j (1935).
7. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 17 (2d ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§ 155 (1935). When dealing with discretionary trusts, the courts will normally
hesitate to review an exercise of discretion by the trustee, even if allegedly un-
reasonable. However, when the trustee has exercised his discretion in bad faith,
the courts will review his acts. 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 815 (1948).
9. Since bv definition the beneficiary has no enforceable interest in a discre-
tionary trust (RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 155, comment b (1935)), it may be won-
dered whether he has any interest at all in such a trust. For how can the
beneficiary's "interest" here be distinguished from a mere expectancy that a
bounty may be bestowed upon the beneficiary-which expectancy may exist as
well 'with a total stranger as with the trustee?
9 CRISWVOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 18, 430-34.2 (2d ed. 1947) ; RESTATEMENT,
TRi STS § 154 (1935). For a further discussion of the nature of support trusts,
see text supported by note 14 infra.
10. See, e.g., Damhoff v. Shambaugh, 200 Iowa 1155, 206 N.W. 248 (1925);
Albergotti v. Summers, 203 S.C. 137, 26 S.E.2d 395 (1943) ; Garland v. Garland,
87 Va. 758, 13 S.E. 478 (1891). Dean Griswold recognizes this distinction, and
indicates that there is no reason for these trusts to be inmmune to creditors' de-
mands. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 433 (2d ed. 1947).
11. The distinction is recognized pointedly in Maynard v. Cleaves, 149 Mass.
307, 21 N.E. 376 (1889), and Young v. Easley, 94 Va. 193, 26 S.E. 401 (1897).
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tains a spendthrift clause, the interest of its beneficiary should be
freely available to his creditors. 12 Because courts have often failed to
distinguish between true support and pseudo-support trusts, the result
in some cases involving attempts by creditors to reach the interest of
a beneficiary of a pseudo-support trust may be an indication of what
a court would hold were it confronted by a case involving a true sup-
port trust. Therefore, cases dealing with pseudo-support trusts will be
considered from time to time in this note for purposes of comparison,
as may seem helpful.
Spendthrift, discretionary, and support trusts are often regulated
to a varying extent by the statutes of the several states. The effect of
statutes upon creditors' rights in regard to support trusts will be con-
sidered at a later point in this note.13
Nature of the Support Trust Beneficiary's Interest
In the support trust, two factors combine to make the beneficiary's
interest inalienable and beyond the reach of his creditors. First, as
with the discretionary trust, the beneficiary's interest is relatively un-
certain in amount. But, as distinguished from the discretionary trust,
whose beneficiary may receive nothing at all, the support trust bene-
ficiary is bound to receive sums sufficient for his support.14 Therefore
it may be questioned whether the uncertainty of the amount which the
beneficiary is to receive, standing alone, is enough to keep the bene-
ficiary's interest beyond the reach of his creditors. At this point the
second factor comes into play: the courts' willingness to uphold the
intent of the settlor, as expressed in the trust instrument, that the
sums to be used for or paid to the beneficiary shall go only for his sup-
port. Since payment by the trustee to the beneficiary's general credi-
tors would not, in most instances, provide such support as would ful-
fill the intent of the settlor, the courts refuse to allow such creditors'
claims to be satisfied from the beneficiary's interest. 1
Certain classes of creditors, however, have on occasion been allowed
to reach the beneficiary's interest in a support trust. These preferred
creditors fall into three categories, each having a different basis upon
which the courts are willing to allow recovery.6 (1) Often, a member
12. See, e.g., Wenzel v. Powder, 100 Md. 36, 59 At]. 194 (1904); Young v.
Easley, 94 Va. 193, 26 S.E. 401 (1897).
13. See text supported by notes 96-107 infra, for a discussion of the various
statutes affecting creditors' rights in support trusts.
14. 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 226 (1951); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS§§ 154-55 (1935).
15. See, e.g., Holmes v. Bushnell, 80 Conn. 233, 67 Atl. 479 (1907); Meek v.Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54 N.W. 456 (1893); 1A BOORT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §
226 (1951).
16. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 157 (Supp. 1948), gives a somewhat different
arrangement insofar as classes of creditors are concerned:
Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest
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of the beneficiary's family, either the wife or a child, has been allowed
to recover sums for support from the beneficiary's interest in a sup-
port trust. In reaching this conclusion, the courts have been willing
to read into the trust instrument an "intent" of the settlor that the
support of the beneficiary include the support of his family as well.17
(2) Similarly, if the person seeking to reach the beneficiary's interest
is one who has performed necessary services to the beneficiary, or sup-
plied him with support, the courts will give his claim preferred status,
although he is usually under a burden of showing that the trustee
abused his discretion by not paying the claim presented, which burden
will make recovery difficult under most circumstances.5 (3) Finally,
if the creditor presents a claim which, in the court's view, is of suffi-
cient merit to override the policy of giving full effect to the settlor's
intent, he may be allowed to recover. Such creditors may, for example,
include divorced wives seeking alimony or a governmental body at-
tempting to collect arrears in taxes.",
As an examination of the cases will show, however, these classes
are neither universally accepted by the courts in allowing recovery,
nor do they provide even a reasonable means of predicting which credi-
tors may succeed in reaching the beneficiary's interest. In short, there
is considerable controversy among the courts as to whether a member
of any particular class of claimants-such as a child of the beneficiary
in the custody of a divorced or separated wife-will be allowed to re-
cover against the support trust.
Before proceeding to an examination of the cases, it should be
pointed out that creditors' rights in support trusts may very well
also be affected by the form of the trust. While the ideal support trust
would provide that the trustee shall, during the lifetime of the bene-
ficiary, apply such sums out of principal and income as shall be neces-
sary for the reasonable support, maintenance, and education of the
beneficiary, with a direction to accumulate unexpended income, and
that the trustee shall pay the remainder of principal and accumulated
income over to designated individuals upon the beneficiary's death,
of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim
against the beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the wife
for alimony;
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary sup-
plies furnished to him;(c) for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or
benefit the interest of the beneficiary;
(d) by the United States or a State or subdivision thereof to satisfy a
claim against the beneficiary.
For purposes of analysis, however, it is submitted that the Restatement's classifi-
cation could well be improved upon; one possible means is employed in this note.
17. See text supported by note 57 infra.
18. See text supported by note 74 infra.
19. See text supported by note 87 infra.
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all support trusts do not so provide. The very mutations among the
form of such trusts may well thwart the settlor's intent and allow any
and all creditors to reach the beneficiary's interest.
Possible variations from the terms set out above are myriad; four,
however, are of particular importance:
(1) When the trust instrument directs that both principal and in-
come may be expended for the support of the beneficiary, but there
is no remainder over of unexpended income and principal, it has been
held that there is an equitable fee simple in the beneficiary and, on
the basis that a restraint on alienation of an equitable fee simple is
void, that neither alienation nor subjection to the claims of creditors
can be prevented.20 On the other hand, some courts have been willing
to uphold the settlor's intent in such situations because it is insisted
that the property passes to the beneficiary's estate free of the trust,
and therefore the restraint is imposed only during the life of the bene-
ficiary.21 A court subscribing to the latter view has described the
former as having "harked back to the doctrine of the English courts."'22
Similarly, when the support trust is to last for a specified period of
time, at the end of which the principal is to be paid to the beneficiary,
it would seem that since the beneficiary is able to convey his remainder
interest, that interest may also be reached by his creditors.23
(2) Likewise, when.the trust instrument directs that the trustee
pay so much of the income as is necessary for the beneficiary's sup-
port, with remainder of principal over, but with no express provision
for the accumulation and subsequent disposal of unexpended income,
the court may conclude that the settlor has created a pseudo-support
trust, as described earlier, 24 and that the beneficiary therefore has an
interest which is liable to the claims of his creditors, since the bene-
ficiary is entitled to all the income.25
(3) A further vital distinction may be made between those trusts
which provide that an amount sufficient for the beneficiary's support
20. Haley v. Palmer, 107 Me. 311, 78 Atl. 368 (1910). In McCreery v. Johns-
ton, 90 W. Va. 80, 110 S.E. 464 (1922), the beneficiary of such a trust was able
to compel its immediate termination.
21. Sheridan v. Krause, 161 Va. 873, 172 S.E. 508 (1934). The Iowa courts,
although they have been often confronted by this problem in various shapes, have
failed to recognize that a problem even exists. See, e.g., Roorda v. Roorda, 230
Iowa 1103, 300 N.W. 294 (1941), and Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54 N.W. 456(1893), where creditors of the beneficiary were denied recovery from the trust,
although in addition to a present right to support, the beneficiary in each case
also had the remainder interest.
22. Sheridan v. Krause, 161 Va. 873, 898, 172 S.E. 508, 516 (1934).
23. Epstein v. Coming, 91 N.H. 474, 22 A.2d 410 (1941); Seattle First Nat'l
Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234, 254 P.2d 732 (1953); of. Perabo v. Gallagher,
241 Mass. 207, 135 N.E. 113 (1922) (discretionary trust). But see the Iowa
cases cited in. note 21 supra.
24. See text supported by notes 10-12 supra.
25. Cf. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234, 254 P.2d 732
(1953).
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shall be paid to the beneficiary, and those which direct that such
amount shall be applied for the beneficiary. Thus, in the Connecticut
case of Foley v. Hastings, the trust income was, at the trustee's dis-
cretion, either to be paid to the beneficiary, or to be applied for the
beneficiary by the trustee. The Connecticut statute provided that when
the trustee had power to withhold the trust income, the beneficiary's
interest in the trust was inaccessible to his creditors.27 In the Foley
case, because the trustee could pay nothing to the beneficiary, but
rather withhold the income and apply it for him, the court concluded
that the trust fell within the terms of the statute and was immune to
creditors. In so ruling, the court disregarded the fact that the clear
purpose of the statute was to keep creditors from reaching discretion-
ary trusts, and that this trust was clearly not discretionary, since the
beneficiary received the same certain amount of benefit whether the
trustee chose to pay the income to him or for him.23
(4) Varying amounts of discretion may be reposed in the trustee
by the terms of the trust instrument. Thus, the trustee may be di-
rected to pay such sums as necessary for the beneficiary's support and
maintenance, or the trust may direct that "any or all" of income or
principal, in the trustee's discretion, be paid for the beneficiary's sup-
port and maintenance. Creditors have often been denied recovery
from the latter type of trusts on the basis that the trusts are of a dis-
cretionary nature.-' It is true that by the terms of the trust instru-
ment more discretion is given the trustee in such a trust. However,
it is doubtful whether these trusts should be treated differently from
other support trusts; a test to determine what treatment they should
receive would be to inquire whether the beneficiary, if he were starv-
ing and destitute, could compel the trustee to pay him anything. Al-
though courts are willing to deny recovery to a creditor of the bene-
ficiary under such a trust, it is seriously to be doubted whether the
beneficiary would receive the same treatment.30
26. 107 Conn. 9, 139 At]. 205 (1927).
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8034 (1949).
28. There is also a practical distinction between providing that the trustees
shall apply trust income or corpus for the beneficiary's support and providing
that he shall pay such sums to the beneficiary: in the former circumstance, it is
a certainty that moneys expended will go to the beneficiary's support; in the
latter case, reliance must be placed upon the beneficiary to expend the funds
for his support. If he fails to do so, the purpose of the settlor is clearly thwarted.
29, See, e.g., Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson, 172 Ky. 350, 189
S.W. 245 (1916), and Davidson's Ex'rs v. Kemper, 79 Ky. 5 (1880), both of
which are discussed in the text supported by notes 49-53 infra.
30. In First Nat'l Bank v. Howard, 149 Tex. 130, 135, 229 S.W.2d 781, 784-85
(1950), the court said,
Despite ftestator's] language that the discretion of the trustee in determin-
inr whether payments shall be made out of the corpus shall be final and
conclusive, its discretion is not absolute. It remains both the province and
duty of the courts to interfere if the trustee acts "outside the bounds of a
reasonable judgment." And to determine whether it has so acted the test
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/10
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One final point should be considered briefly: the matter of a bene-
ficiary with an inseparable interest. When a trust is created with a
number of beneficiaries, whose interests in the trust are inseparable
one from the other, it is usually held that a creditor of one of the
beneficiaries is unable to subject the trust to his claim.3 1 This is true
even though the trust is neither spendthrift, support, nor discretion-
ary. Thus, where a trust is created for the benefit of a man and his
family, the man's creditors cannot reach the trust in satisfaction of
their claims.32 A few cases involving support trusts have arisen in
which the beneficiary has been found to have such an inseparable
interest that his creditors cannot reach it; as a whole, they follow the
rule in regard to trusts in general where there are multiple bene-
ficiaries with inseparable interests.3 3 In addition, the beneficiary's
interest is beyond the reach of creditors if it is of a personal character
or is so indefinite or contingent that it cannot be valued with fairness
to the creditors and the beneficiary 4
Classes of Creditors
The cases in which creditors have sought to reach the interest of
the beneficiary of a support trust to satisfy their claims may be classi-
fied under two broad headings, termed "general" creditors and "spe-
cial" creditors. Special creditors include those discussed above,'3 who
possess claims of unusual merit. General creditors consist of all others,
whose claims have no such exceptional quality. The general creditors,
whose claims are considered by the courts to be of equal merit and
appeal, will be considered as a group; each class of special creditors
will be surveyed singly.
A. General Creditors
As a general rule, which is not, however, without exceptions, it can
be stated that the very nature of the support trust and the willingness
of the courts to uphold what they feel to be the settlor's intent prevent
is: In making or declining to make payments... out of the corpus of the
estate would the trustee be "acting in that state of mind in which the settlor
contemplated that it should act."
In the Howard case the court was confronted with an impoverished beneficiary
and a trustee who asserted that the trust gave him complete discretion; the
court allowed the beneficiary to succeed, holding that the trustee had abused his
discretion.
31. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 435-45 (2d ed. 1947).
32. Russell v. Meyers, 202 Ky. 593, 260 S.W. 377 (1924); Brown v. Postell, 4
Rich. Eq. 71 (S.C. 1851).
33. See, e.g., Harned v. Dorman, 252 Ky. 237, 67 S.W.2d 5 (1934); Shawler v.
Hart's Adm'x, 205 Ky. 93, 265 S.W. 485 (1924); Hackett's Trustee v. Hackett,
146 Ky. 408, 142 S.W. 673 (1912).
34. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 160, 162 (1935).
35. See text supported by notes 17-19 supra.
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the beneficiary's interest from being subjected to the claims of his
general creditors.- '2
Two reasons have been supplied by the courts in denying general
creditors access to the support trust beneficiary's interest. Some courts
have denied such creditors' claims by referring to the general rule-of-
thumb that the right of the creditor against the trust is the same as
the beneficiary's right would be if the beneficiary were suing the
trustee, and concluding that since the beneficiary could not compel
the trustee to pay him anything, neither can the creditor.3 7 Thus, in
the Iowa case of Meek v. Briggs," the trustee was directed to apply
the income for the beneficiary's "support, comfort, and education, so
far as shall be required for such purposes." In an action by a general
creditor to reach the beneficiary's interest, the court, after setting out
the above-mentioned "rule," insisted that the beneficiary
could not maintain an action against the trustees for any part of
this property .... As the right of the cestui que trust, against the
trustee, to recover the property, is the measure of the rights of
the creditor as against the property in the hands of the garnishee,
and as the cestui que trust has no right to the property which she
can enforce [the creditor cannot recover] .-9
Some question arises as to how this "rule" should be applied in other
cases. It may mean that if the beneficiary can, under any circum-
stances, go to court and compel the trustee to pay over any trust
property to the beneficiary, then the creditor can do the same. Such
an interpretation of the rule would clearly be applicable in the Meek
case, since the trustees were to apply the income for the beneficiary,
and not pay it to her; thus while the beneficiary might have success-
fully compelled the trustees to make such an application for her bene-
fit, she could not have compelled them to pay her anything.40 But if
this interpretation is applied to a support trust where the trustee is
to pay the beneficiary a sum sufficient for his support, the rule would
compel a conclusion that a general creditor could recover against the
trust, since the beneficiary could compel the trustee to pay him a rea-
sonable sum for such support. This result, however, would be wholly
inconsistent with the tenor of the court's opinion in the Meek case.
On the other hand, if the "rule" is interpreted to mean that if the
beneficiary could compel the trustee to convey the beneficiary's interest
30. See, e.g., Barnett v. Montgomeiy & Co., 79 Ga. 726, 4 S.E. 874 (1888);
Levi v. Bergman, 94 Ald. 204, 50 AtI. 515 (1901); Nickerson v. Van Horn, 181
Mass. 562, 64 N.E. 204 (1902); Baker v. Brown, 146 Mass. 369, 15 N.E. 783(1888).
37. Roorda v. Roorda, 230 Iowa 1103, 300 N.W. 294 (1941); Meek v. Briggs,
87 Iowa 610, 54 N.W. 456 (1893). This rule is quite similar to that in regard to
assignability, as set out in note 3 supra. Cf. Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 258 N.W.
391 (1935).
39. 87 Iowa 610, 54 N.W. 456 (1893).
39. Id. at 622, 54 N.W. at 459.
40. See, e.g., McCreary v. Robinson, 94 Tex. 221, 59 S.W. 536 (1900).
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in its entirety, the creditor could likewise reach the beneficiary's inter-
est, the result and the interpretation are eminently acceptable. Under
such circumstances, all support trusts would be immune to the claims
of general creditors, since it is clear that the beneficiary is unable to
convey his interest.41
A reason other courts have given for denying general creditors ac-
cess to the beneficiary's interest is closely connected with the desire of
the courts to effectuate the settlor's intent: to satisfy the claims of
general creditors from the trust income or corpus would not be apply-
ing such property to the beneficiary's support, but would rather be
clearly subverting the settlor's intent.42 For example, in Holmes v.
Bushnell,43 the trustee was directed to expend income and corpus for
the beneficiary "as he may need from time to time." The beneficiary
became indebted in the sum of $350 for the purchase of shoes to sell
in his business; as the beneficiary had promised to pay the trust in-
come on the creditor's account but had .failed to do so, the creditor
brought action against the trustee to subject the income to his claims.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that the trust was
one for support, and therefore the income and corpus could go only
for the personal support and comfort of the beneficiary. The bene-
ficiary's pledge of future income was void, and the creditor could not
recover from the trust in an action based on debt.
Other courts have refused to allow general creditors to reach the
beneficiary's interest by calling the trust a "spendthrift" trust.44 In
some cases of this kind, it is difficult to distinguish whether the court
is mistakenly calling the support trust a spendthrift trust, in which
case the court would actually be extending spendthrift trust doctrine
to cover support trusts, or whether the court is reading into the trust
instrument a spendthrift clause, based upon the settlor's "intent," and
therefore truly deciding a spendthrift trust question.
There are cases from two states, on the other hand, holding that the
beneficiary's interest in a support trust can be reached by his general
creditors. In the Virginia case of Hutchinson v. Maxwell,2 a general
creditor was allowed to reach the interest of the beneficiary in a sup-
port trust with a spendthrift clause, the court holding that a trust
was opposed to public policy if creditors could not reach it, and further
41. See text supported by notes 20-23 supra.
42. See, e.g., Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438, 53 Pac. 946 (1898) ; Holmes v.
Bushnell, 80 Conn. 233, 67 Atl. 479 (1907); cf. Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54
N.W. 456 (1893).
43. 80 Conn. 233, 67 Atl. 479 (1907).
44. Everitt v. Haskins, 102 Kan. 546, 171 Pac. 632 (1918) ; Hoffman v. Beltz-
hoover, 71 W. Va. 72, 76 S.E. 968 (1912); cf. Albergotti v. Summers, 203 S.C.
137, 26 S.E.2d 395 (1943).
45. 100 Va. 169, 40 S.E. 655 (1902).
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that the Virginia statute46 applied to allow this creditor to reach the
beneficiary's interest. Nor did the court encounter any difficulty with
the fact that the amount of the beneficiary's interest was uncertain;
the creditor, said the court, "can claim from the trustee the amount
which the [beneficiary] could have claimed should have been applied to
his benefit." The Hutchinson case was short-lived, however; only a
few years after it was decided the Virginia legislature amended the
statute and legislatively overruled the case.47
The situation in Kentucky is singular. The Kentucky statute, passed
in 1796, clearly subjects the trust beneficiary's interest to the claims
of his creditors:
Estates of every kind held or possessed in trust are subject to
the debts and charges of the beneficiaries thereof the same as if
the beneficiaries also owned the similar legal interest in the prop-
erty."
In accordance with the terns of the statute, the Kentucky courts
have held that the interest of a beneficiary of a trust, whether a spend-
thrift or a support trust, is liable to the claims of his creditors unless
the trustee has an absolute discretion whether or not to pay anything
to the beneficiarvy. Since such a trust by definition is not a support
trust, but a discretionary trust,"' it would seem that in Kentucky any
creditor of a support trust beneficiary could reach his interest.
This, however, is not strictly the case. Although the Kentucky courts
apply their rule without deviation, they occasionally appear very lax
in the determination of whether a trustee has absolute discretion under
a particular trust instrument. Thus, in Davidson's Ex'rs v. Kemper,51
the trust instrument recited that the trustee "shall pay to each of my
said three children, or for their use and benefit, quarterly, half-yearly,
or annually, as they may deem most expedient, a sum or sums suitable
and proper for the support of each. .. ." A general creditor of one of
the beneficiaries was denied access to the trust on the ground that the
words "as they may deem most expedient" put an absolute discretion
in the trustee. Similarly, in Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v.
46. VA. CODE § 2428 (1887).
47. The statute as amended is now found in VA. CODE § 55-19 (1950).
48. Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 381.180 (1953).
49. Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson, 172 Ky. 350, 189 S.W.
245 (1916); Davidson's Ex'rs v. Kemper, 79 Ky. 5 (1880); Samuel v. Salter,
60 Ky. (3 Metc.) *259 (1860). In Cecil's Trustee v. Robertson, 32 Ky. L. Rep.
357, 359, 105 S.W. 926, 927 (Ct. App. 1907), the court said:
The rule is, that when the trustee has the discretion to withhold from the
beneficiary all interest in the trust fund, then the fund may not be subjected
to the debts of the beneficiary, but that if the beneficiary may in equity
compel the trustee to pay her a certain part of the estate or income, the
creditors may do the same.
50. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 155 (1935).
51. 79 Ky. 5 (1880).
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Thompson, 52 the trust instrument provided that the trustee "may pay
for the support and maintenance [of the beneficiary] whatever
amount, if any, my said executor may deem reasonably necessary and
proper for that purpose, in the discretion of my said executor." It
was held that the trustee had absolute discretion whether or not to
give anything to the beneficiary. Query: would the result in the two
above cases have been the same if the beneficiary, starving and desti-
tute, had been bringing the action against the trustee instead of one
of the beneficiary's creditors bringing such action?
On the other side of the coin, however, the Kentucky courts have
properly construed most support trust instruments as giving the trus-
tee a certain amount of discretion within reasonable limits, but not as
bestowing upon him an absolute power to exclude the beneficiary en-
tirely.53
In several other states it is provided by statute that creditors may
recover a certain amount-either a percentage, or everything above a
certain sum-from the interests of debtor-beneficiaries in support
trusts.5' Since there are no cases decided under these statutes dealing
with support trusts, the statutes are discussed in the section of this
note dealing with the statutory requirements of the various states.",
B. Special Creditors
There are three classes of creditors whose claims against the bene-
ficiary's interest in a support trust may be considered to have a pre-
ferred standing: (1) members of the beneficiary's family, whose sup-
port the settlor may have intended to be furnished from the trust;
(2) those persons who have contributed to the purpose for which the
trust was established, namely, the furnishing of support and necessary
services to the beneficiary; (3) those persons whose claims, for social,
moral, or legal reasons, the courts may feel should be satisfied from
the beneficiary's interest in the trust. 6
52. 172 Ky. 350, 189 S.W. 245 (1916). In Todd's Ex'rs v. Todd, 260 Ky. 611, 86
S.W.2d 168 (1935), a divorced wife of the beneficiary brought action for alimony
payments against a support trust. The trust instrument provided that if the trust
were successfully attacked in the courts, it should immediately end, and beneficial
interest should vest in the remaindermen. Thus, no one could hope to maintain a
successful action against the beneficiary's trust interest-either the beneficiary
would win in the courts, or the trust would terminate and the beneficiary's interest
would be divested. The action of the divorced wife, then, may have been clearly
spiteful, in order to attempt to divest the beneficiary. The court held the trust to
be discretionary in nature, although in doing so it had to stretch matters consid-
erably, as in the Davidson and Louisville cases; being discretionary, of course, it
was beyond the reach of creditors. The result seems just, although the court's
reasoning seems artificial.
53. See, e.g., Akers v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 192 Ky. 850, 234 S.W.
725 (1921); Cecil's Trustee v. Robertson, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 357, 105 S.W. 926 (Ct.
App. 1907); Samuel v. Salter, 60 Ky. (3 Mete.) *259 (1860).
54. See, e.g., Dean Griswold's model spendthrift trust statute, as adopted by
Louisiana. LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 9.1923 (Supp. 1955).
55. See text supported by notes 96-107 infra.
56. See text supported by notes 17-19 supra.
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(1) Members of the beneficiary's fanily
a. The beneficiary's wife
Since the support of the beneficiary is usually interpreted to include
the support of the beneficiary's family as well as the beneficiary him-
self, it would seem to be the duty of the trustee to furnish the bene-
ficiary sufficient amounts to support not only himself, but his family
as well." As long as the family relationship of the beneficiary and his
wife continues, then, no question arises as to the right of the wife to
support from the trust.
It is only when the family relationship is disrupted, whether volun-
tarily or involuntarily, that cases are found dealing with the wife's
right to support from the trust. Where the amicable relations between
the beneficiary and his wife have not been ruptured, but uncontrollable
circumstances force their separation, it is usually held that the wife
may continue to receive her support from the trust." Thus, where the
beneficiary is an invalid confined to a hospital,r9 or where he has
become insane and has been committed to a mental institution," courts
have directed the t:ustee of the support trust to pay the wife a reason-
able sum for her support.
On the other hand, where marital difficulties have caused the sever-
ing of family relations, leading to separation or divorce, the wife or
ex-wife no longer has a right to support from the trust61 This is true,
it is said, because she no longer is a member of the beneficiary's
family. -
b. The beneficiary's children
Where the beneficiary's children are living in a family relationship
with the beneficiary, it would seem that the support of the beneficiary
includes support of the children. Thus, in Fowler v. Hancock,63 the
New Hampshire court concluded that benefit to the beneficiary's chil-
dren was included within the trust purposes, and ordered the trustee
to pay for the children's support if the beneficiary himself was unable
to do so. Likewise, where the illness or insanity of the beneficiary
takes him from his children to a place of confinement, it is not con-
sidered that the family relationship is broken, and the children are
.57. Cf. Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926).
53. hIn r Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935).
5!0. In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
6o* Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935).
61. Burrage v. Bucknam, 301 Mass. 235, 16 N.E.2d 705 (1938); Eaton v. Eaton,
82 N.H. 216, 132 At. 10 (1926). Contra, RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 157(a) (1935).
Cf. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234, 254 P.2d 732 (1953).
62. Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 At]. 10 (1926).
63. 89 N.H. 301, 197 AtL 715 (1938).
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entitled to support from the beneficiary's interest in the support
trust.
64
When the children are not in the custody of the beneficiary, but in-
stead are in the custody of the beneficiary's separated or divorced wife,
most courts will allow the children to continue to enjoy a right to sup-
port against the support trust.65 Although various other reasons for
allowing recovery to the children have been supplied, that given by
the New Hampshire court in Eaton v. Eaton6 6 is perhaps the most
satisfying:
The divorce did not affect the relationship of the minor child
as belonging to her father's family, within the application of the
term in the testator's contemplation. Nor did the decree granting
the child's custody to her mother remove her from the family
within such contemplation.67
Often, where a child in the custody of a divorced mother is denied
support from the beneficiary's trust interest, it appears on first glance
that justice has miscarried. 68 However, a perusal of such cases reveals
that the action is usually not one asserting that under the trust instru-
ment the child is entitled to support because it was so intended by the
settlor; rather, it is usually an action to enforce a support decree, and
often it is coupled with an action to enforce a decree for alimony.O
In such a situation, the child is usually treated as a judgment debtor
and denied recovery.
The recent Missouri case of Brant v. Brant" illustrates some of the
difficulties present when the child asserts a right to support from the
trust based upon a decree. There, a support trust was established for
B, with power in the trustee to disburse income and, if necessary,
principal, for B's support. B's divorced wife brought an action to
reach the trust for arrears in child support payments, as provided in
a Missouri statute. 1 The wife gained a judgment in the lower court,
64. In -re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943) (illness); Reyn-
olds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935) (insanity).
65. Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S.W.2d 859 (1929); Eaton v. Eaton 82 N.H.
216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926) ; Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234, 254
P.2d 732 (1953); cf. England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922); Kirsten v.
Czysz, (Milwaukee County Ct. 1940), as reported in 1942 Wis. L. REV. 148. Con-
tra, Todd's Ex'rs v. Todd, 260 Ky. 611, 86 S.W.2d 168 (1935); Burrage v. Buck-
nam, 301 Mass. 235, 16 N.E.2d 705 (1938); Brant v. Brant, 273 S.W.2d 734 (Mo.
App. 1954).
66. 82 N.H. 216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926).
67. Id. at 218, 132 Atl. at 11.
68. See, e.g., Todd's Ex'rs v. Todd, 260 Ky. 611, 86 S.W.2d 168 (1935); Buck-
nam v. Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N.E. 918 (1936) ; Brant v. Brant, 273 S.W.2d
734 (Mo. App. 1954).
69. See the cases cited in note 68 supra. However, Burrage v. Bucknam, 301
Mass. 235, 16 N.E.2d 705 (1938), a sequel to Bucknam v. Bucknam, held squarely
that the settlor had not intended the beneficiary's child to be supported from the
trust property.
70. 273 S.W.2d 734 (Mo. App. 1954).
71. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.080 (1949).
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but it was reversed, the upper court pointing out that under the statute
only trust income could be reached to satisfy the decree, and since it
was shown that the trust had no income, there could be no recovery.
An emancipated child of the beneficiary, no longer a minor, may be
allowed to recover from the trust if it can be shown that the settlor
intended the child, as well as its parent, to receive support from the
trust 12 In such a case, however, it would seem that the court would
read the trust instrument far more critically than it would if the ac-
tion were brought to gain support for a minor child of the beneficiary;
in the case of an adult, emancipated child the court is willing to infer
very little, while if a minor child is seeking support, the court often
seems willing to apply its imagination to discover an "intent" in the
trust instrument which will allow the child to reach the trust.7 3
(2) Suppliers of support and necessary services
It is the duty of the trustee of a support trust to furnish the bene-
ficiary with the necessaries of living, at least to the extent that trust
trustee if he is able to demonstrate that the trustee should have fur-
nish such support, the beneficiary may maintain an action to require
him to provide support.74 Similarly, a third person who has supplied
necessary support or services to the beneficiary may recover from the
trustee if he is able to demonstrate that the trustee should have fur-
nished such support or services, but failed to do so. In other words,
one seeking to recover for having supplied the beneficiary with neces-
sary support or services must show that the trustee abused his dis-
cretion in not providing such support or services.75
In order to determine whether there has been such an abuse of dis-
cretion, the court will take into account: the dictates of the trust in-
strument ;' the resources of the trust, the needs of the beneficiary, and
72. Clarke v. Clarke, 246 Ala. 170, 19 So. 2d 526 (1944).
73. In the Clarke case, note 72 supra, the words of the trust instrument ex-
plicitly gave an interest to the child; in such cases as Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H.
216, '32 At]. 10 (1926), and Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234,
254 P*2d 732 (1953), the court was forced to read into the trust instrument a
fictitious intent of the settlor to include the beneficiary's children in his bounty.
74. 4 BOGERr, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 815 (1948).
75. See, e.g., Pole v. Pietsch, 61 Md. 570 (1884); Hanford v. Clancy, 87 N.H.
458, 183 At]. 271 (19:36).
76. City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946); Reilly v.
State, 119 Conn. 508, 177 Atl. 528 (1935). In Walters' Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 AtI.
408 (1924), the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was allowed to recover from a
support trust for the cost of caring for the beneficiary in a state mental institu-
tion, on the basis that the trust was meant for the purpose of providing the bene-
ficiary's support, and reimbursement of the state would merely be carrying out the
testatrix' intent. In Swinson Estate, 167 Pa. Super. 293, 74 A.2d 485 (1950), it
was held that a testamentary trust to provide for the beneficiary's support and
maintenance during his lifetime should be interpreted to provide for payment of
$929 in funeral expenses for the beneficiary.
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the amount which the trustee has furnished the beneficiary; 7" and
whether the trustee had knowledge that the support or services were
being furnished.78 A consideration of all these factors together is
necessary in order to adjudge whether the trustee has, in fact, abused
his discretion, although in a given case one of the factors alone may
appear determinative.79
That the wording of the trust instrument may resolve whether the
trustee has abused his discretion is illustrated by City of Bridgeport
v. Reilly,80 in which the city sought reimbursement from the trust
of three dollars a week paid to the State of Connecticut for the care
of the beneficiary in a state mental institution. The trust instru-
ment, a will, directed that the trustee might "in her discretion expend
or appropriate any or all of the income or principal.., for the com-
fortable support" of the beneficiary, and provided for termination
of the trust and payment of remaining income and principal to the
beneficiary if he recovered from his mental illness. The court looked
to the fact that the beneficiary was confined in the mental institution
when the trust was created, combined this with the "any or all" lan-
guage of the will, and concluded that the testator had taken into ac-
count the aid the state was furnishing, and had intended that the
trust merely supplement such general support furnished by the state.
77. Pole v. Pietsch, 61 Md. 570 (1884); Hanford v. Clancy, 87 N.H. 458, 183
Atl. 271 (1936). In Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo. App. 387, 129 S.W. 224 (1910),
which involved a pseudo-support trust which the court treated as a true support
trust, the trustee was to pay a designated amount for his mentally incompetent
brother. The trustee, undoubtedly an heir-at-law of the beneficiary, failed to ap-
propriate any sums at all for the beneficiary's support, and such support was sup-
plied by another member of the family with whom the beneficiary lived. When
the trustee had accumulated some $3,000 of unexpended income, the action was
initiated by the person who had supplied the beneficiary's support; recovery was
allowed, the court saying that the trustee "will not be permitted to stand by and
neglect to support and care for his ward, all the while suffering others to do so,
and shield himself on The ground that plaintiff was acting without his directauthority." Id. at 391, 129 S.W. at 225.
78. Wright v. Blinn, 225 Mass. 146, 114 N.E. 79 (1916) ; Will of Razall, 243 Wis.
152, 9 N.W.2d 639 (1943); Estate of Ray, 221 Wis. 18, 265 N.W. 89 (1936). In
Will of Walker, 266 Wis. 134, 63 N.W.2d 78 (1954), the court looked to the rela-
tionship between the beneficiary and the claimant, as well as the fact that the
claimant had not notified the trustee although she clearly had the opportunity to
do so, in denying a claim for $50 a week nursing fees for the years preceding
the beneficiary's death. The trustee had paid the beneficiary a total of over$30,000 during the last three years of his life, and had been led to believe that the
beneficiary was paying the claimant for her nursing services. The court further
noted that the beneficiary had conveyed to the claimant all of his personal prop-
erty, including his car and the furniture in his house, had made the claimant the
sole beneficiary of his will, and had given the claimant a promissory note for$8,500. This, the court felt, was somehow compensation enough for anything she
could have done for the beneficiary.
79. See, e.g., Will of Razall, 243 Wis. 152, 9 N.W.2d 639 (1943) (failure to
notify trustee of the hiring of an attorney).
80. 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946). In Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 508, 177
Atl. 528 (1935), an earlier case involving the same trust, the State of Connecticut
was unsuccessful in its attempt to reach the trust property to satisfy its claim
for supporting the beneficiary in a state mental institution.
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Account was taken of the trust resources in the light of the past,
present, and probable future needs of the beneficiary in the New
Hampshire case of Hanford v. Clancy.," There a judgment against the
beneficiary's interest in the trust for $2,410 in favor of a plaintiff who
was "really in effect representing the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts" to recover for the beneficiary's care in a state mental hospital,
was reversed by the upper court, which found the judgment to be un-
reasonable because it would have exhausted the trust without making
any provision for the future care of the beneficiary. There were other
possible uses, said the court, for the trust income and corpus than the
reimbursement of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which other
uses the lower court should have considered in the light of the trustee's
ability to carry them out through the exercise of reasonable discretion.
The upper court concluded, "Affirmative orders of disposition, such as
the court made in this case, may only be sustained if, under the cir-
cumstances, there is but one reasonable disposition possible.' 's 2 Here
such other possibilities had been arbitrarily excluded. Similarly, the
amount the trustee has paid to the beneficiary, when considered to-
gether with the beneficiary's needs and the amount available for the
beneficiary, will often be the determining factor. Thus, in Pole v.
Pietsch,' where trust income over a period of five years was $3,000,
and the beneficiary, in his last illness and in dire need had been pro-
vided with only $200 of the amount, a physician who had attended
the beneficiary regularly through the illness was allowed to recover
a reasonable sum for his services. In this case the court found a clear
abuse of discretion.
A further factor is whether the trustee had knowledge that the sup-
port or services were being furnished by the third party seeking re-
covery, at least to the extent of a request having been made of the
trustee to furnish such support or services. It has been held that
where the beneficiary employed an attorney without making any re-
quest whatever of the trustee for legal services, the attorney so re-
tained could not recover his fee from the trustee.- Similarly, where
the trustee had paid weekly statements of the sanitarium in which the
beneficiary was confined, reasonably believing them to include all ser-
vices furnished, a $2,500 bill for medical services, sent by the sanita-
ri um to the trustee after the beneficiary's death and purportedly cover-
ing the period of her confinement, could not be recovered from the
trust." Where a request is made, but the trustee refuses to assent to
the desired support or services being supplied by the third person, it
81. 87 N.H. 458, 183 Atl. 271 (1936).
82. Id. at 461, 183 Atl. at 272-73.
83. 61 Md. 570 (1884).
84. Will of Razall, 243 Wis. 152, 9 N.W.2d 639 (1943).
85. Estate of Ray, 221 Wis. 18, 265 N.W. 89 (1936).
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is clear that unless such refusal constitutes an abuse of discretion by
the trustee, the third person who supplies the beneficiary in disregard
of the trustee's refusal cannot recover from the trust.8 6
(3) Other persons with claims of especial merit
When a plaintiff presents a claim of a compelling quality against the
beneficiary of a support trust, which claim would not be satisfied but
for access to the beneficiary's trust interest, the courts have sometimes
allowed him to satisfy his claim from the trust property. How com-
pelling the claim must be is apparently a matter for the individual
court to determine. Certainly, it is well above the level of the claim
of the general creditor.
Most cases which have arisen within this category deal with at-
tempts by divorced wives to satisfy their alimony decrees from the
trust property. Although the Restatement of Trusts states flatly that
this can be done,8 7 case authority is directly opposed to allowing the
wife to satisfy an alimony claim from the beneficiary's interest in a
support trust.8 In only two support trust cases has the alimony-seek-
ing ex-wife been successful; of these the Illinois case of England -V.
EnglandB9 is of special significance. There the court, after pointing out
that general creditors could not gain execution from the trust income,
went on to say, however, that the trust instrument
did not provide that such income could not be used in accordance
with a decree of a court of equity to keep Albert C. out of jail for
contempt of court for. a failure to comply with the court's decree
to pay alimony for the support of his wife.
In this State alimony is not a debt. It is a social obligation
as well as a pecuniary liability; it is founded on public policy and
is for the good of society.90
Other courts have not so felt the inner urgings of "public policy"
and the "good of society" in alimony cases. It is true that in several
86. Wright v. Blinn, 225 Mass. 146, 114 N.E. 79 (1916).
87. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 157 (a) (1935).
88. Kiffner v. Kiffner, 185 Iowa 1064, 171 N.W. 590 (1919); Bucknam v. Buck-
nam, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N.E. 918 (1936) (support trust with spendthrift clause);
Foster v. Foster, 133 Mass. 179 (1882)- Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W.
715 (1910); Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926); cf. Roorda v.
Roorda, 230 Iowa 1103, 300 N.W. 294 (1941) (divorced wife seeking alimony
sought to have the support trust upset on the sole ground that it was collusive and
against public policy); Lamberton v. Lamberton, 229 Minn. 29, 38 N.W.2d 72(1949) (divorced wife not allowed to show the size alone of the support trust
corpus in order to increase her alimony payments from the beneficiary; the court
concluded that only when it was shown that the beneficiary was actually receiving
additional income from the support trust could the alimony award be affected).
89. 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922). The only other case involving a support trust in
which the alimony-seeking wife has been succesful is Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18
S.W.2d 859 (1929), decided under the Kentucky statute which allows all creditors,
general as well as special, to reach the beneficiary's interest.
90. 223 Ill. App. at 555.
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cases the issue has not been squarely presented to the courts ;" but in
others, where the divorced wife's counsel did a more able job in pre-
senting the issue, the court has flatly stated that the divorced wife
"stands no better than any other creditor." 2
Although much has been said of the fights of tort creditors, and of
the federal and state governments in regard to unpaid taxes, no cases
seem to have arisen in these areas in which support trusts have been
involved. ' Nor, in view of the wide disparity among the courts in
other cases dealing with support trusts, would it be wise to venture
any kind of prediction as to how courts will hold when and if such
questions do arise.
At first glance the Kentucky case of Rattif's Ex'rs 'v. Common-
'eafth", might appear to be of some importance here. In that case,
taxpayers who had paid an unconstitutional tax to the sheriff of
Nicholas County were allowed to recover against a support trust of
which the sheriff was beneficiary. However, the case is of little value
except to pose a problem, for under the Kentucky statute" even the
general creditors of the sheriff would have been able to recover from
his interest in the support trust.
Statutes Affecti4g Creditors' Rights in Support Trusts
Statutes in virtually every state affect to some degree the ability of
creditors to subject a debtor-beneficiary's interest in a support trust
to their claims. Because of their great number and variety, it is not
within the scope of this note to describe them all, or even an appreci-
able number of them. Rather, it is proposed to describe briefly some of
the terms of such statutes, as illustrative of the form they may take."
The Kentucky statute,"r to which reference has been made through-
91. See Roorda v. Roorda, 230 Iowa 1103, 300 N.W. 294 (1941) in which thedivorced wife sought a declaration from the court that the trust was void as
against her, because collusive and opposed to public policy; Lamberton v. Lamber-
ton, 229 Min. 29, 38 N.W.2d 72 (1949), where the wife sought to increase her
ahmony payments by showing that the trust from which the beneficiary received
his suppo)t was worth some $700,000,
11,2, Eucknam v. Buclniam, 294 Mass. 214, 220 200 N.E. 918, 921 (1936). State-
munts t,> the same effect are found in Foster v. Fester, 133 Mass. 179 (18S2), and
Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 AtI. 10 (1926).
€i:1. See, ., RESTATE,%E NT, TRUSTS § 157(d) (Supp. 1948), and the Caveat to§ 157 (193 5),
,04. 139 Ky 533, 101 S.W. 978 (1907).
Y. KR. EV. STAT. $ 381.180 (1953).96. For a complete survey of the various state statutes as they affect spend-
thnft trusts, and incidentally, support trusts, see GRIswOLD, SprDw-RiFT Tituss§§ 1 .3-230 (2d ed. 1947).
97. Kr. RiV. STAT. § 38.180 (1933). Although Maryland, Mississippi, andOhio have statutes worded similarly, the courts of those states have not given to
them i be aweeping effect that the Kentucky courts have given its statute; in those
three states, support trusts would apparently be unreachable by creditors. MD.
ANN, Coo art. 9, § 10 (1931); Miss. CODE ANN. § 849 (1942); Ouxo GEN. Cons
ANN, 11760 (1940).
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out the course of this note, clearly allows all trusts, with the exception
of discretionary trusts where the trustee can withhold all benefit from
the beneficiary, to be subjected to the claims of creditors. Two other
states have statutes which were originally similar to Kentucky's, but
which have been amended rather considerably by allowing trusts to
be created of a particular maximum size,98 or without any size limita-
tion at all,99 in which the beneficiary's interest is held beyond the
reach of his creditors.
The statutes of some states allow creditors of any trust beneficiary
to reach a percentage of trust income when such income exceeds a
minimum amount. 100 The Louisiana statute, for example, modeled
upon Dean Griswold's model trust statute, allows creditors to reach
by attachment ten per cent of income if the income exceeds twelve
dollars a week; general creditors may also reach any income in excess
of $5,000 a year.:"' Although this statute is designedly aimed at spend-
thrift trusts, it would appear to affect support trusts as well.
On the other hand, there are a number of statutes which expressly
provide for the immunity of support trusts. In two states these stat-
utes apply to a limited class of persons, such as close relatives of the
settlor, or minors and persons non compos mentis.102 The statutes of
other states of this group, however, do not so limit the beneficiary. 10
The California statute, for example, provides that where there is no
provision for accumulation of income, creditors may reach such in-
come only to the extent that it is not necessary to the support of the
beneficiary, thus removing the amount necessary for support from the
reach of creditors. 10 4
The Connecticut statute is singular in that it allows a court of equity
to order payment of surplus to creditors "as justice and equity may
require."'105 Other statutes allow a particular class of creditors to
reach the beneficiary's interest. o6 Thus, the Missouri statute allows
the wife and child of the beneficiary to reach trust income for either
support or alimony.107
98. VA. CODE § 55-19 (1950).
99. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3538 (1955).
100. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1923 (1950); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2:26-182 to
2:26-184 (1937); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 684; OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.25 (1941).
101. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1923 (1950). The Oklahoma statute is similarly
modeled upon Dean Griswold's draft. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.25 (1941).
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 108-114 (1935); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1950).
103. CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 859, 867 (1949); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.63, 26.69(1937); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 59-0310, 59-0318 (1943).
104. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 859, 867 (1949).
105. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8034 (1949).
106. LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1923 (1950); Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.080 (1949).
107. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.080 (1949).
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CONCLUSION
In summation, some general statements concerning the ability of
creditors to reach the interest of the beneficiary of a support trust
may be ventured. General creditors, unless allowed to do so by a stat-
utory provision, cannot subject the beneficiary's interest to their
claims. On the other hand, courts will usually look favorably upon
members of the beneficiary's immediate family, often reading into the
trust instrument an "intent" of the settlor to provide for the bene-
ficiary's family. When the family group is broken by divorce or sepa-
ration, however, the wife will not be allowed to claim support from the
trust; in such a situation recovery for the children in the wife's cus-
tody becomes more difficult, although it is usually allowed where the
child claims that the settlor intended him to be a beneficiary. Where
persons have supplied the beneficiary with services or support with-
out the concurrence of the trustee, in order to recover from the trust
it is incumbent upon them to prove that the trustee, in refusing to
pay, has abused his discretion. Finally, although many arguments have
been advanced for allowing the wife to reach the beneficiary's in-
terest for alimony, only one case, exclusive of statute, has done so.
There is clearly a case for allowing any bona fide creditor of the
beneficiary of a support trust to reach the beneficiary's interest in
satisfaction of his claims. The injustice in allowing a support trust
beneficiary to live comfortably upon what the trust provides, while
barring those to whom the beneficiary is indebted or to whom he owes
a duty of support, is quite evident. Persons not so fortunate as to be
supported by property placed in trust for them must live within their
means; is it inconsistent to require that such a trust beneficiary live
within his means?
If the beneficiary's creditors are to be allowed to recover, some
standard must be applied in order to gauge the manner and amount
of their recovery. To allow a creditor to take everything which the
beneficiary would otherwise receive from the trust is too extreme; it
would reduce to poverty the beneficiary wholly dependent upon the
trust for sustenance. Similarly, to give effect to the settlor's intent
as the criterion for allowing creditors to recover is at the other ex-
treme; to say that the settlor could do what he liked with his prop-
erty, and therefore he could give it to the beneficiary but keep it from
the beneficiary's creditors, is absurd."'
1 08. Although the "rule" that the settlor might do as he liked with his prop-
erty, and therefore could give it to the beneficiary free of the claims of the bene-
ficiary's creditors represents the basis for the modern spendthrift trust doctrine,
and is doubtless here to stay, nonetheless, it appears to be a rule peculiarly in-
digenous to the spendthrift trust notion, and has no other basis in law. The bitter
attack made by the late John Chipman Gray upon the spendthrift trust notion
was but a voice in the wilderness. GRAY, IIESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF
PRoPERTY i-xii (2d ed. 1895).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/10
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
A judicially created and interpreted "public policy" standard is too
dependent upon the very human whim of judges to be a satisfactory
basis for determining what rights, if any, a creditor is to have. A
proper standard, it would seem, should come out of the legislature. As
has been shown, however, the legislative dictate as to creditors' rights
against support trusts has by no means been consistent. Some states
allow all creditors to reach the trust, with the value of the beneficiary's
interest the only limit upon their recovery; others protect the benefici-
ary completely. Neither is satisfactory; some means must be found
for striking a balance between beneficiary and creditor. Further, some
means must be provided for giving certain creditors preference over
others-the beneficiary's children should be provided for first, for
example, whether or not the court is able to read into the trust instru-
ment some nebulous "intent" of the settlor.
Dean Griswold's model spendthrift trust statute is a notable step
in what appears to be the proper direction. In terms broad enough to
include support- trusts as well as spendthrift trusts, it provides that
when the amount paid to or for the beneficiary exceeds twelve dollars
a week, the beneficiary's creditors may reach by attachment ten per
cent of such income; that creditors may reach all such amounts when
they exceed $5,000 a year; and that certain claimants, such as a mem-
ber of the beneficiary's family, or an alimony claimant, or a supplier
of necessary services or support, or a tort claimant, may be allowed
by the court to reach whatever amount is consistent with justice "un-
der the circumstances."109
Although no model statute can represent the last word in the ex-
pression of legislative policy, nevertheless the model statute outlined
above does point out unmistakably the direction in which any legis-
lature must work to end the inequity and achieve a just balance be-
tween the support trust beneficiary and his creditors.
ROBERT R. YOUNG
T. LAUER
109. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 565 (2d ed. 1947). See text supported
by notes 100-01 sxpra. In the same section of his treatise, Dean Griswold also
sets out a "short form" of his proposed statute which would allow the courts to
determine on an equitable basis what portion, if any, the creditor could take. 1
ScoTT, TRUSTS 791 (1939), also discusses allowing the courts to determine what
portion the creditor should be allowed to take. It would seem, however, that a
statute to this effect would be at least a partial abdication of the legislative
function.
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